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AN INTEGRATIVE REVIEW OF THE PREMISES AND CAUSES OF CONFLICT INTERACTIONS

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Abstract. *The paper presents interdisciplinary views on the causes and premises of conflict interactions, initiated in the behavioral plane by force of verbal and non-verbal conflict triggers. The relation of genetic, situational short-term and socially-acquired long-term factors to the emergence of inner psychophysiological states of the individual, fostering conflict interactions, is reviewed from a psychophysiological perspective. A linguopragmatic aspect of unleashing interpersonal conflicts is examined in the light of the theory of face, well-known in linguistic studies, where face represents a social value, which a person endeavors to obtain, preserve and restore by means of certain communicative acts, including those leading to conflicts. A specific attention is paid to explicit face-threatening acts embodying impoliteness and rudeness, as well as implicit face-threatening acts, apt to initiate a conflict in a more manipulative way. Results of the integrative review of the premises and causes of conflict interactions are presented in the form of a combined classification, the levels of which are placed according to the logic of a hierarchical interrelationship between psychophysiological, psychoenergetic and linguopragmatic factors of the conflict behavior initiation by the communicator. Classification criteria include psychophysiological factors of conflict initiation (genetic, situational, socially-acquired), the instinctive function that feeds the rise of conflict energetically (discharge of an unpleasant affect or generation of a pleasant affect), the dominant cause of conflict (cognitive, social, economic), the way of making an insult (implicit or explicit) and the type of the conflict trigger (verbal, non-verbal, verbal and non-verbal).*

Keywords: *conflict, communicator's inner affect, instinctive functions, communicators' conflict behavior, communicator's face, face-threatening act, insult.*

Introduction

Interpersonal conflicts are ubiquitous in social life. They run through works of fiction and art, are covered in mass media, and codes of law have long since incorporated the norms, regulating conflict interactions between citizens. Social experience has confirmed the typicality and inevitability of interpersonal conflicts manifesting themselves in recognizable behavioral patterns. Naturally, the thinkers have been considering the causes of conflicts between people, their destructive and constructive potential and the possibilities of their prevention and resolution. The emergence of interpersonal conflicts has been traditionally explained through the flaws in human nature or the detrimental effect of society on people. Conflict phenomena have been looked into even more thoroughly since the advance of experimental methods in psychology and neurophysiology. Also, with the intensification of the cognitive and pragmatic research in linguistics much interest has been gained in the studies of conflict discourses. Still, despite a considerable demand for methods of prediction, prevention and resolution of interpersonal conflicts, their elaboration within linguistics is complicated because of the absence of a systemic interdisciplinary review of the prerequisites of interpersonal conflicts. This paper is focused on the systematization of the key factors influencing the initiation of interpersonal conflicts.

Methods

A review of the peculiarities of conflict development described in scientific papers demonstrates that they have been consistently researched by philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, communication theorists and linguists. That is why a retrospective analysis of the scientific data has been conducted in order to single out the most essential psychophysiological, psychoenergetic and pragmatic factors, inciting communicators to start conflicts. Then, based on the logic of the hierarchical involvement of these factors, they were represented in a verbal and graphic form of a combined classification, developed according to the principles, described in Klimeniuk (2007, pp. 111–118).

Results and discussion

1. Philosophical views on the causes of conflicts interactions

Philosophical views on the causes of conflict interactions are based either on the idea that man is evil and conflicts are thus inevitable, or that man is generally kind or at least neutral, but the defects of the society and the inequality existing in it ruin the relations between people. In fact, few philosophers, including Confucius, St. Augustine, Th. Aquinas, J.-J. Rousseau, object to the judgement that people are evil by nature and state that wrath is not innate (Confucius, 2007, p. 97; Saint Augustine, 2015, pp. 628–629; Aquinas, 1923, p. 816; Rousseau, 1987, pp. 35, 54–56). The causes of interpersonal conflicts are then seen in the realities of social life with its economic inequality (Confucius, 2007, p. 97; Rousseau, 1987, p. 43), an insufficient regulation of social roles (Confucius, 2007, p. 22), the divergence between culturally approved aims and socially granted ways of their achievement (Merton, 1968, pp. 188–189), the striving of certain people or groups towards dominance and conquests (Saint Augustine, 2015, p. 630). Thus, when perceived intimidation and unfairness transcend a certain limit (Aquinas, 1923, p. 820), people's self-preservation activates, instigating protests and revenge (Rousseau, 1987, pp. 64–65). There is also understanding that such frustrations may be a result of the person's subjective assessment of the social situation (Merton, 1968, pp. 188–189, 232–233, 476–477).

A lot more philosophers seem to be skeptical in their assessment of human nature. Epicurus (2006) considers it weak and susceptible to wrath, while Hobbes (2003, pp. 70, 88–

89, 110–111), Machiavelli (1998, pp. 65, 67–68), Gumpłowicz (1907, S. 107), Simmel (1907, S. 55–56) point out that people are inherently egoistic, envious, idle, ruthless and occasionally change their minds under the influence of affects, which leads to discord and wars. Nietzsche (1918, p. 52) believes that people's atrocity reflects their pleasure of insulting others. In his opinion (*ibid.*, pp. 19–21), the best possible line of behavior in a conflict is an opportune extinguishing of the inner tension by fighting back. Contrary to that, impossibility or fear to express one's indignation are conducive to the accumulation of resentment – craving for revenge, which further promotes conflict. Also K. Boulding (1978, pp. 67–92) in his theory of conflict interaction states that quarrelsome behavior and standing animosity towards others are natural for humans. Simmel (1907, S. 55–56), as well as Spencer (1954, p. 58) conjecture that man is genetically inclined towards aggressive protective behavior and channels it into conflicts, arguments and scandals. Spencer also adds (*ibid.*, pp. 371–372), that in a modern world a permanent source of nervous stimulation is granted by creating an artificial sphere of hostile interpersonal relations. Under such circumstances man's dangerous instincts and natural egoism are tamed by means of education and upbringing (Gumpłowicz, 1907, S. 12–13, 22; Mosca, 1923, pp. 108–109; Spencer, 1954, pp. 312–313; Rousseau, 1987, pp. 64–65), even though moral standards and codes of behavior may give rise to superstitions and taboos capable to ignite intra- and interpersonal conflicts (Parsons, 1954, p. 57).

Eventually, one more group of thinkers holds that human nature is rather neutral, so the likelihood of people's leaning towards good or evil is even and their real selves are revealed in strained situations under the power of strong affects (Plato, 1997, pp. 1000, 1062–1063, 1070–1071, 1180; Bacon, 1908, pp. 19–21, 180). In Kant's (1999, pp. 533–534) opinion, man's advantage is the availability of moral sense, while his weakness is the inability to control himself under the influence of emotions and a propensity for sudden and abrupt, though short-term affects, e.g., wrath, which impede logical thinking (*ibid.*, pp. 535–536).

Thus, external factors inciting a person to a hostile and quarrelsome behavior include social inequality and injustice (Plato, 1997, pp. 1091–1092; Aristotle, 1959, pp. 113, 115; Bacon, 1908, pp. 61–70), a need to struggle for survival, resources, prestige or power (Maltus, 1803, p. 15; Spencer, 1954, p. 58; Sumner, 1940, pp. 16–17; Sorel, 1925, pp. 145–146, 196–197; Weber, 1978, p. 42), divergence in the interests of people (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 275), elites (Pareto, 1920, pp. 289–295), "we"-groups (Sumner, 1940, pp. 12–13), intentional unjust actions of other people (Plato, 1997, pp. 978–979, 1071–1072), violation of communicative norms (Aristotle, 1926, pp. 175, 177), people's insulting comments on the actions, remarks and personalities of their opponents (*ibid.*, pp. 175, 177; Machiavelli, 1998, p. 196; Spinoza, 2002, pp. 271–272; Bacon, 1908, pp. 61–70), flaws in education (Bacon, 1908, pp. 181–184), destructive influence of mass culture (Coser, 1956/2001, pp. 44–45; Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, pp. 110, 115), tragic coincidences (Aristotle, 1926, p. 109), loss of property or honour (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 209).

On the other hand, internal drivers of conflicts may be such human defects as excessive selfishness (Plato, 1997, pp. 1062–1063, 1070–1071; Spinoza, 2002, pp. 291–292, 294–295), moral depravity (Aristotle, 1926, p. 119), loss of control over one's powerful irrational affects including wrath, envy, atrocity, hatred or anger (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 281, 285; Kant, 1999, p. 535; Weber, 1978, p. 25; Pareto, 1920, pp. 289–295), suppression of natural desires by rational mind to conform to social standards and norms (Plato, 1997, pp. 1062–1063, 1070–1071, 1180–1181; Kant, 1999, pp. 45–46), a necessity to abate the nervous

excitation arisen due to the activation of natural instincts (Spencer, 1954, pp. 371–372; Coser, 1956/2001, pp. 44–45).

2. Psycho-physiological and psycho-cognitive premises of the emergence of interpersonal conflicts

Temperament is seen as a primary biological basis for the behavioral reactions of people and presents the totality of their inborn psychophysiological and psychoenergetic characteristics embracing energy level, emotional reactivity, mood, response speed, reserve and curiosity (Shapar, 2007, pp. 522–524; APA Clinical, 2013, p. 580; APA, 2015, p. 1071; Hayes & Stratton, 2003, p. 290). These characteristics are conditioned by the peculiarities of the neural system, in particular, the speed of the energetic excitation and inhibition as well as energy consumption rates. Types of temperament vary within the extremes of “power – weakness”, “excitability – inertness”, “instability – rigidity”, “balance – lack of balance”. Still, the dynamics of inner psychophysiological processes associated with temperament may discord with the behavioral style adopted by the individual (Shapar, 2007, pp. 522–524).

In an attempt to understand the inner psychoenergetic motivation of people’s behavior in conflicts it may be essential to refer to the notion of instinct (Lat. *instinctus* – instigation, impulse, inspiration), which denotes a genetically conditioned incline, motive, aimed at a certain function (Matsumoto, 2009, p. 258; APA Clinical, 2013, p. 303; APA, 2015, p. 544; Hayes & Stratton, 2003, p. 138) and actualized as “a complex pattern of behavior of obvious survival value in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness” (Matsumoto, 2009, p. 258). Considering this, it is logical to assume that fundamental instinctive functions, the activation of which launches a sequence of inborn and/or socially acquired algorithms of actions (see, e.g., the definition of instinct in Kalita & Klimeniuk (2022, p. 365)), are self-preservation (accompanied by the reduction of negative psychological tension) and drawing pleasure. The ways in which these functions come into action in a social situation may vary (Shapar, 2007, pp. 176–178). It is also essential to remember that in every moment of people’s lives their body is a source of interoceptive sensations, forming the feeling of affect (Feldman Barrett, 2017, p. 73) or “visceral, vegetative self” (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998, p. 248). Russell’s model (Russell, 1980) presents the varieties of affect as combinations of its valence (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant) and arousal level (high, mid, low). The mentioned features prompt the idea that people perceive and assess their affects as the mood – a positive, negative or neutral background of their existence, the reason or quality of which is often not interpreted or analyzed (APA Clinical, 2013, p. 365; APA, 2015, p. 666; Shapar, 2007, pp. 275–276; Matsumoto, 2009, p. 314). At the same time, the affect influences human behavior invariably and unconsciously – the phenomenon described by L. Feldman Barrett (2017, p. 75) as “affective realism”.

The instinctive functions of self-preservation and drawing pleasure seem to be typical drivers of people’s behavior, urging them to regulate their ongoing or predicted affects by doing something in order to return the affect from an unpleasant (negative) back to a normal one as a display of self-preservation, or upgrade it from an unpleasant to a neutral one, from a neutral to a pleasant one or from a pleasant to an even more pleasant one in an attempt to draw pleasure. Interestingly, the varieties of conflict behavior may also exemplify these functions, e.g., displacement aggression helps an individual to reduce stress and renew balance in the neural system, while instrumental aggression is done for pleasure (Sapolsky, 2017, p. 21).

The definitions of “a need”, “an instinct”, “a drive”, “a motive”, “a wish”, “an intention” in psychology (APA Clinical, 2013, pp. 188, 252, 306, 367–368, 378, 623; APA,

2015, pp. 14, 336, 549, 670–671, 692, 1159; Hayes & Stratton, 2003, p. 92–93, 175; Dreikurs Ferguson, 2004, pp. 585–587; Shapar, 2007, pp. 36, 264–266, 351–352, 355–358) make it possible to reconstruct the up-to-date views on the psychoenergetic mechanism of human behavior. Thus, the lack or the loss of something needed or desired for the people's survival, well-being or self-fulfillment causes a physiological tension in their body – a diffuse and unconscious or vaguely conscious need. When the tension reaches a certain threshold, its energy feeds an instinctive drive to alleviate it by satisfying the need or reducing or avoiding an unpleasant feeling. Then there emerges a motive – an energetic arousal of varying intensity, a correlate of an unconscious or – if a person chooses to analyze it – a conscious readiness to put physical and/or mental effort into achieving the goal. If such readiness is available, the need transforms into a definite wish, dream or intention. Compared with a wish – a rather clear idea of a possible action required to satisfy the need, the intention is a more definite readiness to perform an action, aimed at achieving a predicted result by means of a chosen strategy and respective means of its implementation.

So, everyday psychic tensions mirroring people's needs and adjusting their affects are incited by inner and outer stimuli and form the basis of their actions. Still, for the conflict to be initiated, especially when the parties become morally ready to insult, intimidate and humiliate their opponents (Shapar, 2007, pp. 216–217), their inner negative psychological tension has to reach a sufficient level. Results of the experiments conducted in the 1930–50s by J. Bruner, L. Postman, E.M. McGinnies, E.L. Cowen, E.G. Beier, S. Rosenzweig, R.S. Lazarus, R.A. McCleary and others demonstrated that under the influence of emotional disturbance and alarming stimuli including taboo words (e.g., whore, bitch) cognitive reactions of the subjects slowed down a bit compared with their perception of neutral vocabulary and could be accompanied by physiological reactions like increased sweating already on the level of subception. A tendency towards the repression of unpleasant information grew in parallel with the growth of threat to the subjects' self-respect (Maddi, 1989).

The study of cognitive foundations of internal and interpersonal conflicts makes it clear that even though a social situation may be bound with objective conflict triggers, actual conflicts grow on the basis of a subjective evaluation of the situation by the communicators (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski & Klar, 1989, p. 234). Thus, F. Heider (1946) examines the cognitive representation of balances in the relations between individuals and the ways of overcoming possible disbalances, e.g., by convincing oneself that the person is not responsible for the insult or the person has positive and negative features. The likelihood of an interpersonal conflict increases when it is impossible to achieve the balance. In his turn, L. Festinger (1968, pp. 16–17, 260–261) postulates that people's inner comfort is under threat when their views, attitudes or values are confronted by discordant cognitive elements contained in the incoming information. If the resulting cognitive dissonance brings forth a serious psychic discomfort, the individual will be willing to eradicate it (*ibid.*, pp. 18–19, 23, 263–265). When a certain new idea is likely to increase a dissonance, its adoption by the individual is inhibited by the protective mechanisms of his psychic (*ibid.*, pp. 136–137). To the contrary, already established ideas and decisions are supported and stabilized, thus individuals tend to adhere to their views. As a result, such views become rigid and one-sided, people may dispute with their opponents fiercely, be dogmatic and stubborn (*ibid.*, 1968, p. 33). In the conflict, growing emotional excitation influences the assessment of the opponents, so they are seen in a negative light and their motives are often misinterpreted and distorted (Festinger 1968, pp. 182–183; Sapolsky, 2017, pp. 611–612).

The experimental data (Luria, 1960, pp. 23–24, 114–115, 205; Kruglanski et al., 2023, pp. 453–454, 457) demonstrated that in case of internal conflicts a strong energetic tension, incited by a significant stimulus from the object of discontent, influences people's affect in a negative way and may energetically depress the inhibitory impulse of the taboos of the mind. As a result, people's control of their behavior is reduced, and they may not be able to hold their impulsive motor and speech reactions in check (Luria, 1960, pp. 53–54, 181). The actual manifestation of such reactions can hardly be predicted (*ibid.*, pp. 17, 34, 171–172, 176, 180), but, on the whole, hormonally conditioned energy of nervous arousal makes people act less rationally, violate social norms more often and make more spontaneous decisions (Sapolsky 2017, p. 102). According to Luria (1960, pp. 74–75), the chances of intense affective reaction increase in case of individual's emotional instability, exhaustion, excessive cognitive load, in a strained situation aggravated with verbal and/or physical aggressive stimuli, when the individual's important goal is impeded or failed, they are put to shame, discriminated or excluded (Kruglanski et al. 2023, p. 452; Luria, 1960, pp. 39, 74–75). Under a long-term stress neural schemes connected with a display of negative emotions become easier activated, thus contributing to more frequent impulsive displays of aggression and more acute perception of conflict triggers. Negative impulses may often be discharged against random objects – things or people, e.g., lower-ranked individuals, thus featuring a well-described phenomenon of displacement aggression (Sapolsky, 2017, p. 128; Lorenz, 1963/2002, pp. 164–165).

Research of aggressive behavior in the 1930-1950s in Yale (J. Dollard, L. Dube, E.N. Miller, A. Bandura and others) resulted in a formation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939/1968), according to which frustrated needs accompanied with negative affects lead to aggression without fail (*ibid.*, pp. 1–2). The influence of the negative affect is such that an insignificant insult may be perceived more dramatically, as an attack (Kruglanski et al., 2023, p. 447, 457). The hypothesis was updated in 1941 (E.N. Miller, R.R. Sears) with a specification that aside from aggression frustrated needs may give rise to other, socially accepted reactions (*ibid.*, p. 446). Still, from an evolutionary standpoint, hostile aggressive behavior is considered a basic means of regulating individual's psychological needs and, moreover, establishing, restoring or increasing personal significance, which has become the leading motive of human behavior (Kruglanski et al. 2023, p. 445–460; Berkowitz 1993, p. 27).

Interestingly, E. Fromm (1974, p. 237), relying on I. Sechenov's research in physiology, conjectures that an additional reason of conflict behavior may be that a human nervous system is occasionally in need of arousal and thus people are inclined to look for suitable sources of it. As wrath, fury and atrocity can call forth a more intense arousal compared with love and creativity, and require less patience, self-discipline, critical thinking and self-restraint, aggressive behavior often becomes a more preferable way of stimulation, being actualized in the passive form of watching the news and violent scenes on TV, and in numerous active forms in the interpersonal communication – from making stinging remarks to an opponent to physical violence (*ibid.*, pp. 242–251).

Thus, we may assume that the inborn systemic settings of an individual, conditioning the emergence and development of conflict situations include the following:

1) individual's temperament, correlating with the neurophysiological impulses of arousal and inhibition, which defines the level of individual's emotional lability, irritability and reserve;

2) people's basic instinctive functions of self-preservation and drawing pleasure, with genetically flexible ways of their realization;

3) the phenomenon of 'affective realism' (Feldman Barrett, 2017), according to which people perceive the ongoing situation in the light of their affect, so subtle insults may be perceived more dramatically;

4) 'significance quest' (Kruglanski et al., 2023) as a leading motive of people's social behavior and a chief means of regulating their psychological needs, with hostile aggressive behavior as a typical method of achieving significance;

5) the fact that potentially alarming conflict triggers, e.g., taboo words, arouse people's anxiety on the level of subception, and the threat to their self-perceived significance as well as their predicted inner discomfort activate the defense mechanisms of the psychic;

6) a need that the nervous system occasionally has to redistribute its tensions and obtain stimulation, with aggression (passive or active) as the easiest and the most accessible source of it.

Situational psychophysiological factors of conflict interactions are as follows:

1) emotional anxiety caused by a powerful stimulus and intensified by hormones, can inhibit the taboos of the mind and loosen people's control of their behavior, thus making people behave more impulsively, violate social norms, protect themselves and support their status more fiercely, display less empathy towards others;

2) the possibility of a strong affective reaction depends on the emotional stability of people, their current physical and mental state, which could be aggravated by exhaustion or intense cognitive load, a strained situation, especially in combination with the opponent's provocations;

3) in each particular case intense negative affect gives rise to the instinctive drive towards its regulation by means of satisfying a certain need or coping with an unpleasant feeling;

4) the communicators may subjectively interpret the situation as a conflict one, and the course of the conflict may be complicated by viewing the opponents in a distorted light due to a strong negative arousal.

Eventually, certain acquired states of socio-psychic nature may influence the initiation of conflict interactions:

1) the course of the conflict depends on what behavioral algorithm turns out to be energetically most significant for a person due to its statistical efficiency in the optimization of the affect. To a certain extent, available sociocultural restrictions and taboos may influence the choice of such an algorithm;

2) a long-term stress may simplify the activation of neural schemes connected with the uncontrolled display of negative emotions and impulsive aggression in response to the available or predicted conflict triggers;

3) a significant cognitive dissonance in the individual's knowledge system is able to instigate an intensive negative affect and energetic tension which may threaten individual's psychological well-being and lead to confrontations with others.

3. Linguopragmatic aspects of the emergence of conflict interactions

As the majority of people's objectives can be carried out only through effective interpersonal interaction, the establishment of a sustainable collaboration is considered to be a social good, achieved by means of a relatively stable system of cultural standards and taboos. In a harmonious society communicative standards are based on emotional empathy and delicate treatment of other people, and in case of discord the communicators are

prescribed to demonstrate respect to each other and express their disagreement in a way, not insulting for the opponent (Goffman, 1967/1982, pp. 10–11; Ho, 1976, p. 883). Besides, the communicators' common sociocultural background facilitates the predictability of the course of their interaction while unexpectedness can stimulate emotional uncertainty and trigger conflicts (Goffman, 1967/1982, pp. 11, 13–14; Arndt & Janney, 1985, p. 22). Important also is the communicators' awareness of their mutual communicative history and reputation based on their own experience of interacting with each other and on the rumors reflecting such experience of other people (Milinski, 2016; Wu, Balliet & Van Lange, 2016; Romano et al., 2021). In fact, dictionary definitions of the "reputation" accentuate it being an outer assessment of the individual's behavior, formed over time (e.g., "the opinion that people in general have about someone or something, or how much respect or admiration someone or something receives, based on past behaviour or character" (COD); "overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in general" (WNWCD); "[guter] Ruf" (Duden); "opinion favorable ou défavorable du public pour quelqu'un, quelque chose" (Larousse)). As reputation is accumulated over a period of time and is relatively stable, the notion of it does not seem flexible enough to be used in the analysis of dynamic conflict interactions.

A consideration of how people represent their selves and interact with the selves of others in communication brings us to the Jung's concept of "persona" (Jung, 1972, pp. 208, 216, 264) denoting an image formed by individuals and representing their personalities in social interactions. People's personas comply satisfactorily with the norms established in the society and help them perform socially approved decent and respectable roles while covering, where necessary, their real selves (ibid., pp. 216–217). In their turn, linguistic and pragmatic studies of conflict interactions employ a metonymic concept of face, embodying both people's idea of themselves as their usual, beloved images and also how, in their opinion, their interlocutors see themselves and how this influences their illocution and actions. Such interpretation of face makes this notion quite suitable for the descriptions of conversational dynamics and the interpretation of the speakers' communicative intentions. What is more, this meaning of face is idiomatically fixed in different languages, e.g. to show a face, to adopt / put on a / the face of smth., to lose face, to save face, ein anderes Gesicht aufsetzen, das Gesicht wahren / retten, montrer son vrai visage), and is devoid of the psychoanalytical connotations associated with "persona".

The notion of face comes originally from China and is understood there as *lien* (keeping to high moral standards) or *mien-tzu* (possessing a social prestige), or both (Ho, 1976, p. 867–868). E. Goffman (1967/1982, pp. 5, 10) introduced the notion of face into the Western scientific discourse in the meaning of an abstract social value, which can be supported, increased or lost in communication. People's assessment of their face quality in communication influences their mood, and when the expectations are not met, a feeling of insult and shame may arise (Goffman, 1967/1982, pp. 6, 8; Arndt and Janney, 1987, p. 380; Culpeper, 2011b, p. 66). People may lose their faces because they violate communication rules, or, conversely, are humiliated by others (Ho, 1976, p. 873) and are not able to react properly. The loss of face is perceived as a trouble, a ruinous feeling of shame, "a psychic scar" (ibid., p. 876).

As R. Watts (2003, p. 155) opportunely notes, human nature in itself does not bind a person to be polite. Moreover, communication often becomes a battle for power (Leech, 2014, p. 42), while politeness is a display of communicative altruism and a psychological disposition towards it has to be formed in people in the process of their socialization (ibid., pp. 3–4, 6, 11, 26, 90; Lakoff, 1990, p. 34). At the same time, verbal impoliteness and, even,

rudeness may be considered typical within certain communicative genres, including public debate, discussions in mass media, court proceedings, training of recruits in the army, interrogation of suspects or prisoners of war. In a number of popular TV shows and reality shows conflict behavior of the participants entertains the viewers, especially because their observation of conflict is anonymous and their own face is not under threat (Leech, 2014, pp. 219–220, 224, 300–301; Culpeper, 2011b). The likelihood of sporadic conflicts is particularly high in certain spheres of communication, e.g., in social service (Leech, 2014, pp. 5–6). R. Lakoff (2005, p. 29) states that politeness is often forgotten in response to the rudeness in public, uncontrolled displays of hostility (e.g., “road rage,” “air rage”), taboo words, hostile and insulting disputes on the internet, lack of gratitude, violation of privacy. The anonymity of communication on social networks minimizes the threats to the communicators’ faces, so politeness is no longer a means of keeping conflicts in check (Leech, 2014, p. 300; Lakoff, 2005, p. 32; see also Lorenz, 1963/2002, p. 274).

However, on the whole people are inclined to prevent aggression and conflicts by means of mutual support of their faces in communication and protect their faces when needed (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 1, 61–62). If a new act in a dialogue is recognized as a face threatening act (FTA) (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 10–11) because of its marked verbal, paraverbal or non-verbal means, a compensatory ritual containing a more or less standard sequence of speech acts and/or actions is likely to be launched in response. If the addressee does not react to the FTA properly, the speaker may be willing to claim the power and change the relationship balance. Envisioned face threat may enable a person to evade dangerous contacts, involve intermediaries, get out of the conversation before the conflict erupts, refrain from unpleasant topics and actions (Goffman, 1967/1982, pp. 15–16). Also, when the FTA is made, the addressee may choose not to react to it in order to make an impression that the face loss did not take place (*ibid.*, pp. 9, 13, 16–17).

If the face offence drawn on by the FTA is incompatible with any social dignity criteria, e.g., in case of using taboo words or committing physical violence, remedial actions are required to restore the communicative balance (*ibid.*, pp. 19, 32, 253–254). Thereto people resort to the tactics from the repertoire of their microculture, essential subcultures and cultures. As a rule, the FTA is made up for in the following way – the addressee challenges the speaker by attracting their attention to the insult and allowing them to redeem it, e.g., by saying that it was a joke, providing additional explanations or admitting the inadequacy of the FTA, then granting a compensation like an apology and expressing gratitude upon being forgiven (Goffman 1967/1982, pp. 19–23, 242–243). Still, if the offender keeps behaving inadequately, initiators of the challenge find themselves in a weak position and either have to recourse to more decisive actions, a revenge, or to abstain from threats hoping to punish the offender in the future (*ibid.*, pp. 22–23, 39–40). In fact, the apology threatens the offender’s face, and the admission of guilt may often seem even more unbearable for the offender than the escalation of the conflict (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 67–68; Leech, 2014, p. 131). Besides, the algorithm of correcting the insult may be used by the offender for manipulation, putting on a show and leaving insults unpunished, especially when the surrounding people are ready to tolerate the violation of communicative norms (Goffman, 1967/1982, p. 24).

Typical FTAs include orders, demands, refusals, denials, mockeries, curses, challenges, complaints, insults, accusations, warnings, reprimands, boasting, grumbling, demanding apology, expressions of displeasure or criticism, displays of selfishness, contempt and antipathy (Leech, 2014, p. 221). Quite unpleasant are FTAs against the addressees’ positive image, e.g., their appearance, behavior, abilities, generosity (Brown & Levinson,

1988, p. 78; Leech, 2014, p. 145). The choice of the FTA type (bald-on-record, on-record with face redress, off-record) (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 68–69) is based on the most essential parameters of the context. Their list, without a doubt, includes the correlation of power that the communicators have over each other (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 15, 74–82) or, more precisely, a hierarchical vertical distance between them, dependent, on the one hand, on the relatively stable indicators of status, power, age, the roles in a certain typical role set (Leech, 2014, pp. 98, 103, 107), and, on the other hand, on the situational variables, e.g., a sudden weakness in the display of power and character, the availability of alliances. No less essential is the social (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 15, 74–82) or horizontal (Leech 2014, pp. 98, 103, 107) distance between the communicators, based on whether the speaker is familiar/close or unfamiliar with his interlocutors, sympathetic or unsympathetic towards them. Thus, in formal relations more value is assigned to the communication rituals while in informal speech interruptions and distractions may be tolerated (*ibid.*, pp. 33–36, 39–40). Eventually, influential sociocultural norms and taboos (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 15, 74–82) or, from a slightly different perspective, face gains and losses in case if FTA is carried out, are taken into consideration (Leech 2014, p. 11).

The use of a bald-on-record (overtly explicit) FTA may generally demonstrate that the speaker is not socially motivated to minimize the risk for the interlocutor's face (Leech 2014, pp. 87–89). It happens either because the speaker is enraged, is willing to be rude and does not care about the interlocutor's face, and/or has enough power to ignore the possibility of retaliation or refusal to interact (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 69, 94–97, 248). In their turn, the interlocutors may decide that such an explicit FTA releases them from the responsibility to be polite (Leech, 2014, p. 32). Impolite utterances possess a specific verbal and paraverbal marking that is easily recognizable and attracts much attention (Culpeper, 2011a, p. 131; Leech, 2014, p. 224). The worst case of verbal impoliteness is rudeness, a direct insult which binds the utterance immediately with the conflict discourse (Leech, 2014, p. 223). The use of insulting words adds an aggressive charge to the utterance, transforming it into a rude one (Leech, 2014, pp. 229–231; Allen & Burridge, 2006, p. 237) and provoking the addressee to a retaliatory emotional reaction (Leech, 2014, p. 230).

In off-record FTAs the illocution is expressed implicitly, so, technically, the addressee can choose between several variants of their interpretation (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 68–69). Masking the illocution of the FTA may be advantageous for the speaker as it reduces the chance that their face will be lost and their reputation damaged if the addressee decides to interpret the utterance as an insult (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 71, 78, 211–212; Arndt & Janney, 1985, p. 28). Also, if the speaker's status is lower than the addressee's or the effective sociocultural taboos are too powerful to be trespassed, the implicitness of the off-record FTA leaves the speaker more room for maneuver (Brown & Levinson, 1988, pp. 225–227). Off-record FTAs are realized through the use of metaphor, irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautology, hints. Nevertheless, the communicators' common knowledge, the intonation of the utterance, the accompanying non-verbal means and the context of the conversation narrow the interpretation of the illocution (*ibid.*, pp. 68–69, 212, 222, 237, 225–227).

The results of reviewing the interdisciplinary views on the premises and causes of conflicts interactions are presented in the form of a combined classification in Figure 1 below. The classification criteria are placed according to the logic of the interrelation of psychophysiological, psychoenergetic and pragmatic aspects in the realization of the conflict behavior by the speaker.




Fig. 1. Classification of the premises and causes of conflict interactions

On the first level of the classification genetic, situational and socially acquired bases for the initiation of conflict interactions are represented. Genetic bases involve temperamentally conditioned rates of psychic irritability and the degree of control over it, the instinctive drive to obtain or restore one's personal significance and optimize one's inner affect, an evolutionally molded aggressive reaction to threats for the people's self-respect and their inner comfort, the ability of a person's negative affect to bring about a more dramatic perception and assessment of the current situation, an incline towards the re-distribution of tensions in the individual's neural system and getting a psychic stimulation at the expense of passive or active forms of aggression. At the same time, in a communicative situation conflict triggers may boost strong negative emotions, urging people to act more impulsively, less empathetically and violate social norms more easily. Situationally conditioned variables of the individuals' inner state, capable to influence their emotional lability and make them more susceptible to conflict triggers, include exhaustion (physical, emotional, cognitive), nervousness due a strained situation, aggression on the part of other communicators, the individuals' feeling of being insulted, humiliated, discriminated. Eventually, certain acquired psychological states, connected with the functioning of internal conflicts and accompanied by a lasting stress, may potentially be conflict-prone.

The second level of the classification features how the basic instinctive functions of self-preservation and drawing pleasure are involved in the regulation of the affective state of an individual. Behavioral algorithms, chosen to carry out these functions, help discharge the

negative affect as a display of self-preservation or, differently, transform a negative or typical affect into a positive one, or advance a positive affect to an even more positive one as a display of the function of drawing pleasure. Pertaining to conflict behavior it means either a discharge of an unpleasant affect or a manipulative initiation of the conflict to generate a pleasant affect.

On the third level of the classification possible causes of conflict interactions are seen as cognitive, social and economic ones. The cognitive cause is associated with the availability of a dissonance in a cognitive system of an individual. Resolution of the interpersonal conflicts growing out of such dissonances is impeded by certain peculiarities of the human cognitive system. On the one hand, cognitive elements threatening to increase the dissonance in it are inhibited by the protective mechanisms of the psychic while, on the other hand, already stabilized attitudes and views acquire a significant energetic support. A social cause of the conflict interaction is seen as the protection, preservation or formation of one's social face as a value directly connected with the inner psychological comfort of the individual. Finally, the economic cause of conflict interactions is understood as the regulation of one's inner affect by means of struggling for the ownership or power over certain objects or people.

Finally, the fourth and the fifth levels of the classification are related to the formal features of face-threatening acts realization. Thus, people may express themselves in an explicitly insulting way when they are not concerned with face risks, e.g., because they cannot restrain their intense negative emotions or have power over their interlocutors and thus are not afraid of retaliatory actions, or the communication is anonymous. A more manipulative insult is expressed in an implicit way, and the addressees themselves have to decide whether to start a conflict or endure the insult as if it has not taken place. Understandably, the chosen way of making an insult prescribes the form of a potential conflict trigger which can appear in a verbal, non-verbal or in both forms simultaneously as is often the case with oral communication.

Conclusion

The theoretical model presented above can facilitate a systemic analysis of the premises and causes of conflict interactions by taking into account the psychophysiological, psychocognitive and linguopragmatic factors enabling communicators to perform verbal and/or non-verbal conflict actions. The given scheme can be used in the linguistic research of the samples of conflict discourses to examine the linguoenergetic, linguocognitive and linguopragmatic bases of the formation of the emotional and pragmatic potential, sufficient for the conception of a conflict discourse attractor. This, in its turn, could foster the outlining of the typical patterns of conflict discourse attractors on the basis of the experimental samples of conflict discourses and help follow up the role of verbal and non-verbal means in the programming or changing the conflict discourse trajectory in its bifurcation points.

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ІНТЕГРАТИВНИЙ ОГЛЯД ПЕРЕДУМОВ І ПРИЧИН КОНФЛІКТНИХ ВЗАЄМОДІЙ

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Анотація. У статті наведено міждисциплінарні уявлення про причини і передумови конфліктних взаємодій, що ініціюються у поведінковій площині дією вербальних і невербальних конфліктогенів. У розрізі психофізіологічних досліджень міжособистісних конфліктів розглянуто вплив генетичних, ситуативних короткотривалих і соціально-набутих довготривалих чинників, що призводять до формування внутрішніх психофізіологічних станів індивіда, сприятливих для спалахування конфліктів з іншими. Лінгвопрагматичний аспект ініціювання міжособистісних конфліктів розглядається крізь призму відомої у мовознавстві теорії обличчя, що розглядається як соціальна цінність, задля набуття, збереження та відновлення якої людина вдається до певних комунікативних дій, зокрема і таких, що призводять до конфліктів. Особливу увагу приділено експліцитним актам загрози для обличчя, що часто репрезентують комунікативну неввічливість і грубість, а також імпліцитним актам загрози для обличчя, що здатні призводити до конфлікту більш маніпулятивним шляхом. Результати інтегративного огляду передумов і причин конфліктних взаємодій представлено у вигляді комбінованої класифікації, рівні якої розміщено згідно з логікою ієрархічної взаємодії психофізіологічних, психоенергетичних і лінгвопрагматичних чинників ініціації конфліктної поведінки комунікантом. У якості ознак класифікації обрано психофізіологічні чинники виникнення конфлікту (генетичні, ситуативні, соціально-набуті), інстинктивну функцію, що енергетично живить зародження конфлікту (погашення негативного афекту чи генерування позитивного афекту), домінуючу причину конфлікту (когнітивна, соціальна, економічна), спосіб нанесення образи (імпліцитний або експліцитний) і тип конфліктогену (вербальний, невербальний, вербально-невербальний).

Ключові слова: конфлікт, внутрішній афект, інстинктивна функція, конфліктна поведінка комунікантів, обличчя комунікантів, акт загрози для обличчя, образа.

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